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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
lengthy concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and
Burton, in the U. S. Supreme Court decision of the Miracle case,"0
is devoted entirely to showing the inherent vagueness of the word
"sacrilegious". Besides tracing historically the various meanings
ascribed to the word and the resulting confusion, the appendix to
the opinion contains quotations from over thirty dictionaries,
which show that dictionary definitions of the word differ and that
no clear meaning may be derived therefrom.
Other Aspects of the Miracle Case
Because of the importance of, and intense interest in, the case
now under consideration, further issues in the case will be discussed at this point. Petitioner advanced the contention that
EDUcATIoxq LAw §122 is unconstitutional as a violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, in that
the licensing scheme interferes with religious liberty. In refutation, the Court of Appeals relied on the proposition that freedom
of religion is not an absolute right. It pointed out that a statute
which has a legitimate objective within the police power of the
state is not unconstitutional though it constitutes some restraint
on the free exercise of religion.'1 The statute promotes the public
welfare, morals, peace and order. "These are the traditionally
recognized objects of the exercise of police power," said the
court. 8 Further, a state may protect religious beliefs from
private or commercial attacks and prevent offenses to decency and
morals even though there be incidental benefit to religion, or a
religion, if this be the case here.' 9
The other major issue in the case arose through the objection
that the statute is unconstitutional in toto as a prior restraint on
the freedoms of speech and press; that films should be included
within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
as a means of expression of ideas. The Court of Appeals relied
squarely upon the Mutual Film case, and refused to accept the
contention that technical developments have changed the essential
nature of movies since the time of the Mutual Film decision. The
rationale of this position is that movies are primarily a form of
commercial entertainment, rather than a means of expression, and
as such can be regulated.
16. 343 U. S. 495 (1952).
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
18. 303 N. Y. 242, 259, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 672.
19. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
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It was upon this last issue that the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the decision of the Miracle case ;20 in fact,
it was the only issue considered by the majority. The Supreme
Court explicitly overruled the Mutual Film case, saying:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant
medium for the communication of ideas. . . The importance
of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to
inform.
The Supreme Court went on to state that the fact that exhibition
of films is carried on for profit does not alter their status, pointing
out that newspapers and magazines are likewise operated for a
profit.
Thus, the New York State statute requiring a license to be
acquired before a film may be publicly exhibited constitutes a
prior restraint on the freedoms of speech and press, and, as such,
is unconstitutional.2 2 The Supreme Court went on to point out
that it was dealing specifically with the statutory authority to
deny a license on the determination that a film is "sacrilegious"
and held that a state has no interest in the protection of any or
all religions from adverse views sufficient to justify prior restraint
upon the expression of those views. Whether or not a carefully
drawn statute prohibiting the exhibition of "obscene" films is
unconstitutional was expressly excluded from the holding of this
case.
The ultimate fact of the over-all New York State system of
licensing films before exhibition remains undecided. That the
Motion Picture Division may no longer deny a license to a film
because it is deemed "sacrilegious" is certain. Whether the
other grounds for denial of a license, namely, that the film is
"obscene", "indecent", "immoral", "inhuman" or "of such
a
character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or
incite crime", will withstand constitutional objection remains to
23
be seen.

20. Supra n.16.
21. 72 S. Ct. 777, 780.
22. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
23. On June 13, 1952, the Appellate Division affirmed (3-2) a denial of a license
for the film "La Ronde" on the grounds that it was "immoral" and "would
tend to corrupt morals." Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, App. Div. , 114 N. Y. S.
2d 561 (3rd Dep't 1952).

